

JDAI INTRODUCTORY POWERPOINT

Slide #1: JDAI—The Annie E Casey Foundation

- ✓ Purpose of today's presentation is to provide an overview of the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative; to clarify why we do detention reform, what is involved, what can be expected of us, what we expect of you.
- ✓ For those who don't know, the Annie E Casey Foundation is the nation's largest philanthropy devoted exclusively to improving the life chances of the nation's most disadvantaged and vulnerable children and youth.
- ✓ One of the key ways that Casey tries to accomplish this mission is by strengthening and improving those public systems responsible for helping the kids who have the worst odds of succeeding in our society.
- ✓ This strategy of public system reform predictably leads Casey to work in juvenile justice where one finds some of the nation's most disadvantaged *and disliked* youth. These children, especially those who penetrate to the deeper ends of the juvenile justice system, are among those with the worst odds of making successful transitions to adulthood.

Slide #2: Our Vision

- ✓ Our work in juvenile justice reform, therefore, is driven by a vision that seeks to change the odds for court-involved youth, that seeks to increase their chances of growing out of their delinquent behavior and leading healthy, productive lives.
- ✓ It is important to recognize that this vision is not simply predicated on a desire to enhance the life chances of kids who engage in delinquent behavior. We also recognize that if we change those odds, fewer youth will graduate to criminal behavior as adults, fewer will suffer the plagues of drug and alcohol abuse as adults, fewer will have checkered employment histories that minimize their abilities to support families.
- ✓ Of course, if juvenile justice reform can improve the life chances of court-involved kids in these ways, we all benefit. Public safety will be improved, our labor force will be strengthened, families will remain intact and self-supporting, and government will spend far fewer taxpayer dollars on corrections, public health and other remedial interventions.

Slide #3: Why Detention Reform?

NOTE: THE LINES OF THIS SLIDE APPEAR INDIVIDUALLY AS YOU CLICK THE REMOTE OR ADVANCE THE COMPUTER. PLEASE REMEMBER TO SYNCHRONIZE SCRIPT TO WHAT'S ON THE SCREEN!

- ✓ Over 15 years ago, as we looked for a way to help juvenile justice systems change to better accomplish this vision, we decided to focus on the detention component of the system. Why?
- ✓ For one thing, detention was a huge part of juvenile justice that had gone unstudied, much less changed in many years. One well-known federal court appeals judge had even referred to detention as the “hidden closet of the juvenile justice system”, a testament to how little light had been shined on it despite the fact that, in those years, there were more than half a million admissions to secure detention centers annually. Our analyses of detention in the early 1990s revealed a system that was arbitrary, discriminatory, ineffective and very expensive, hardly a ringing endorsement of good government.
- ✓ Second, we believed then—and we think we have demonstrated conclusively now—that detention could be a powerful entry point for broad system transformation. What does that mean? Simply put, we believed that the policy, practice and program changes required to reform the detention component of juvenile justice would quickly prove relevant to other components of the system, and that the lessons and techniques learned from detention reform would end up improving the system overall.
- ✓ Here’s one simple example: JDAI is a data-driven process, meaning that system personnel learn to use objective information to make policy and program decisions. We figured that if we could create an appetite for the use of data regarding detention, that appetite would not stay restricted to that part of the system diet. Stakeholders would be hungry for data about all aspects of their system.
- ✓ Third, we focused on detention because it is the start of the slippery slope that leads kids deeper and deeper into the system. For years, research has shown that youth who are detained are more likely to be

formally petitioned, to be adjudicated delinquent and to be placed out of home at the dispositional end of the system. If we could safely minimize detention, our theory went, we could effectively minimize unnecessary penetration of youth into the system and free up public resources from the deep-end, where the lion's share of money gets spent.

- ✓ Finally, we focused on detention for one simple, opportunistic reason: in the early 1990s there was a national detention crowding crisis, one that confronted many jurisdictions with difficult and generally negative choices, like building more cells and spending more money to operate them. We recognized that the crowding crisis might motivate some jurisdictions to test whether there were system reforms that could safely reduce reliance on secure detention.
- ✓ The data related to that crowding crisis, furthermore, provided evidence that the system was not working and that, indeed, places needed to make changes.

Slide #4: ADP of Juveniles in Detention Centers

- ✓ This graph shows what happened to create this crowding crisis. Basically, between 1985 and 1997 the average daily population in detention nationally doubled.
- ✓ As we will show in a different way in a couple of slides, these increases were not simply driven by increases in delinquent behavior. That is, the growth in detention use did not track a corresponding growth in juvenile offending.

Slide #5: % Juveniles in Overcrowded Centers

- ✓ The growth in the nation's detention population resulted in crowding. We simply outgrew our capacity to house these youngsters.
- ✓ As this graph shows, by 1995, almost two out of every three arrested youth who were admitted to secure detention facilities entered places that were operating above their rated capacities. That is, most kids were entering places that were over-crowded.
- ✓ Put another way, these youth were being put in facilities that all professional standards, experience and case law demonstrate are unlikely to be able to provide the levels of custody or care that we are obliged to provide when we deprive a youth of his or her liberty. Crowding results in staff stress, limited programming, health and mental health hazards, higher rates of assault, overtime costs...you name it.
- ✓ Many jurisdictions were faced with the awful dilemmas of investing more money in new facilities, run the risk of having staff or youth injured in their crowded ones, or get sued, either for operating unconstitutional facilities or for individual injuries.

Slide #6: Overrepresentation of Minority Youth

- ✓ Now it would be one thing if the crowding crisis was simply driven by rapid increases in serious juvenile offending and we, as a society, just hadn't been able to respond to these trends in a timely way. But there's more behind this story than that.
- ✓ As you can see in this chart, most of the increases in the use of detention nationally resulted from vastly increased rates of detention for minority youth. Today, almost two out of every three kids in secure detention is a youth of color. These proportions are inconsistent with minority representation in the population as a whole AND also disproportionate to the arrests.
- ✓ Between 1985 and 1995, detention rates for African-American youth increased 180%; for Latino youth the rates increased 140%. During this same period, detention rates for white youth actually decreased slightly. Clearly, there were alarming patterns underlying the demographic shifts in the detention population.

Slide #7: One-Day Counts in Detention Facilities

- ✓ Overcrowding and racial disproportionality would perhaps be understandable if kids in detention were gang-banging, gun-toting serious offenders. But the data revealed otherwise.
- ✓ As this slide shows, if you take a snapshot of youth in detention on any given day, you find fewer than one-third are held for violent offenses, a category which in this slide is inflated because misdemeanor assaults—common school yard fights, for example—are included.
- ✓ In fact, almost as many youth are detained because of status offenses, violations of court orders related to status offenses and probation violations as are held for “violent” offenses. This group, typically, consists of kids who have angered or frustrated adults by violating rules. These are kids we are angry at, not kids we fear.
- ✓ Similarly, the largest group of youth in detention is held for property and public order offenses, non-violent crimes that often don’t require secure detention to ensure court appearance or good behavior. (6 out of 7 of youth detained for drug charges, by the way, are held for possession, not sale or distribution.)
- ✓ These data raise fundamental questions about why we are detaining these kids. We could present additional data that would deepen those questions. For example, we could show you statistics that reveal that a very large percentage of youth are detained and released within five days. If these kids really posed significant public safety risks, would they be in and out so quickly?

Slide #8: Different Directions

- ✓ Earlier, we noted that detention trends were not driven by juvenile offending. This graph dramatically illustrates what we mean.
- ✓ As most of you know, we have enjoyed, over the past decade, greatly decreased rates of juvenile offending. Indeed, serious juvenile arrests have reached their lowest levels since we started collecting reasonable data on this subject.
- ✓ However, as this graph shows, even though the overall number of arrests for index crimes (the most serious category of offenses in the FBI's typology) dropped precipitously starting around 1995, detention populations continued to grow. If detention use were a function of juvenile crime, we would have expected to see a corresponding decrease in detention use over the past decade, but we haven't.
- ✓ These data revealed a very important truth: detention use is not primarily driven by juvenile offending, but rather by the policies and practices—and corresponding behavior—of the adults who work in and manage the juvenile justice system. That is why, if you study detention nationally, you will find some places that detain few kids and have low rates of delinquency; places that detain few kids and have high delinquency rates; places that detain lots of youth and have low juvenile crime; and, finally, places with both high detention rates and high juvenile crime rates.
- ✓ THE POINT IS, DETENTION IS IDIOSYNCRATIC BY JURISDICTION. THIS IS ENORMOUSLY IMPORTANT TO OUR DETENTION REFORM MODEL. WHAT THIS MEANS IS THAT TO CHANGE DETENTION PATTERNS, WE NEED TO FOCUS ON THE BEHAVIOR OF THE PEOPLE IN THE SYSTEM, HOW THEY MAKE DECISIONS, HOW TIMELY THOSE DECISIONS ARE, WHAT OPTIONS ARE AVAILABLE, ETC.

Slide #9: Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative

- ✓ Based upon these analyses, and given the mission we described earlier, the Casey Foundation designed a multi-site, multi-year project—called the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative, or JDAI—that sought to test a simple notion: that jurisdictions could safely reduce reliance on secure detention.
- ✓ We want to emphasize the word “safely”: JDAI is not a jail-break and we are as concerned as any organization about public safety outcomes. Indeed, we believe, and our sites have repeatedly shown, that detention reform improves public safety.
- ✓ You might think of JDAI as an effort to ensure that the right kids are detained, but only the right kids and only for the minimum period of time needed.
- ✓ JDAI’s objectives are relatively simple. First, it seeks to enable sites to eliminate inappropriate or unnecessary use of secure detention. Again, the emphasis is on “inappropriate” (as when kids are detained for reasons other than detention’s basic purposes) or “unnecessary” (as when kids are detained for want of options or held longer than needed because we don’t make move their cases in timely ways). Is there anyone in this room who supports inappropriate or unnecessary detention? Of course not.
- ✓ The second objective goes to public safety: detention is supposed to be used when youth pose significant public safety or flight risks. In JDAI, we actually track these outcomes, whereas most jurisdictions, despite wholesale reliance on detention, really don’t know what their failure-to-appear or pre-adjudication re-arrest rates are. In fact, one of the reasons that JDAI sites have improved public safety outcomes is because the system becomes accountable for those outcomes.
- ✓ Third, we wanted to ensure that public funds would be redirected to successful (but only successful) reform strategies, either through secure detention costs avoided (e.g., no need to build more beds) or actual savings, as has been true in many of our sites where units of secure facilities have been closed and the operating costs redeployed for other purposes.

- ✓ Finally, because we know that there will be some youth who pose serious risks and who must, therefore, be detained, our objectives seek to ensure that those youth—and the staff responsible for them—will be held in facilities that, at a minimum, pass constitutional muster and, preferably, represent the best the field has to offer. Put another way, JDAI sites should aspire to operate facilities whose conditions of confinement are of such qualities that people in this room would not fear if it was their children who were being detained.

Slide #10: Core JDAI Strategies

NOTE: THE LINES OF THIS SLIDE APPEAR INDIVIDUALLY AS YOU CLICK THE REMOTE OR ADVANCE THE COMPUTER. THE SCRIPT REGARDING EACH CORE STRATEGY BEGINS WITH A NEW PAGE!

- ✓ So, how did we expect sites to transform themselves? JDAI is based upon 8 core strategies. (By the way, to learn more about these strategies, including how they actually play out on the operational level, we encourage all of you to read about them in publications like the series of monographs known as *Pathways to Juvenile Detention Reform*.)
- ✓ The first JDAI strategy is **COLLABORATION**. If we really intend to change juvenile justice, then all of the key stakeholders, especially those with policy making authority, need to be at the table. This includes the judges, prosecutors, defenders, probation, detention, law enforcement and program people. Absent this kind of participation, even the most thoughtful new policies and programs may end up unsuccessful because of lack of support or appropriate implementation.
- ✓ In addition, JDAI collaboratives typically include representatives of other public systems that are often “feeders” to juvenile justice. For example, schools, especially with the advent of “zero tolerance” policies, are often the source of a large percentage of delinquency referrals. Similarly, many high need, but low risk youth end up in juvenile detention because of decisions made by child welfare or mental health personnel. These stakeholders should be part of redesigning the detention system, too.
- ✓ Finally, we have found that representation from community-based organizations and families of court-involved youth is essential to meaningful change. This is especially true if we are going to address racial disparities in the system.
- ✓ All JDAI sites form formal collaboratives charged with assessing system operations, planning needed reforms and then monitoring whether those reforms are having their desired impact. It is

important, though not necessarily required, that the work of these groups have formal sanction (e.g., a county board resolution).

- ✓ Most sites also establish work groups as parts of their collaboration, individual task forces charged with recommending specific changes in policy or practice. Some of those work groups should become more obvious as we consider the other strategies.

- ✓ **RELIANCE ON DATA** is the second core strategy. In most places, juvenile justice policy and practice is based upon anecdote, myth or worst case scenarios, rather than objective, timely information that can actually clarify what's happening.
- ✓ Data on detention utilization in most places is eye-opening. For example, as we noted earlier, most places release a majority of their admissions within a very few days. What was accomplished as a result of that detention? Did the detention center give the youth a pill that ensured their good behavior? We doubt it.
- ✓ Similarly, local detention data generally reveals where bottlenecks occur in case processing, unnecessarily extending lengths of stay.
- ✓ Other data may help to clarify why detention rates or lengths of stay are different for different racial and ethnic groups. Without such data, we do know that system personnel will never get to solutions to this vexing problem.
- ✓ All JDAI sites should (a) collect utilization data to clarify how they are using detention and (b) should develop routine data reporting to enable system stakeholders to track progress. We have developed a variety of model tools for these purposes. Absent the collection and use of data, systems can't possibly expect to change their patterns.

- ✓ **OBJECTIVE ADMISSIONS SCREENING** is the third core strategy of JDAI.
- ✓ Part of the reason why jurisdictions detain too many youth is because they lack the tools needed to accurately distinguish those youth who pose significant public safety risks from youth who many simply have important needs or how are a pain in the butt. In JDAI sites, objective screening tools, referred to as risk assessment instruments—RAIs—are designed and tested so that jurisdictions can more effectively ensure that the right youth are being confined.
- ✓ RAIs also increase the odds that all kids are treated the same, that their likelihood of detention is not a function of who arrested them or who screened them into custody. RAIs enable sites to eliminate what may be unintended bias from detention admission decisions. They also help to identify which youth can be placed into non-secure detention alternatives.
- ✓ Objective screening tools, including objective criteria for use by law enforcement, is simply good government. If we can make more accurate decisions regarding the risk posed by arrested youth, we can better ensure that the right kids are detained. Similarly, if police can avoid spending time on detention procedures in cases where youth will soon be released, those officers can be on patrol or solving crimes instead of wasting time transporting youth to facilities and filling out paperwork unnecessarily.

- ✓ **ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION** programs are the fourth core strategy. The idea here is simple: if we want to reduce reliance on secure detention, we usually need more options than straight release and secure custody. If those are the only two options available, we will choose detention more than necessary because it's a safer bet.
- ✓ Most jurisdictions claim to have alternatives to detention, but in most places the kids served would not have been detained anyway. These programs “widen the net”, a term that refers to the common tendency to impose stricter conditions of release on youth who would not have been confined if the program did not exist.
- ✓ Net widening is bad for several reasons. First, program investments will not achieve their goal of safely reducing the use of detention.
- ✓ Second, net widening will probably increase detention use for two reasons. First, by imposing stricter monitoring on youth who would not have been detained, we are more likely to identify transgressions that lead to violations and, therefore, to the detention center.
- ✓ Similarly, net widening may increase detention use because it distorts proportionality in the system. If lesser offenders—those who pose lower risks—are placed into restrictive alternatives, those youth who do pose moderate risks will appear as poorer candidates for release.
- ✓ ATD programming should be relatively simple. Remember, we are talking about pre-adjudication cases, so we are concerned with ensuring that youth appear in court and don't re-offend.
- ✓ In most JDAI sites, a simple continuum of ATD programs suffices. This typically includes some form of home confinement, day or evening reporting centers for youth without easily monitorable activities, and a limited number of shelter beds (or foster homes) for those youth who don't have a home to which they can return.

- ✓ **EXPEDITED CASE PROCESSING** is the fifth core strategy. Detention populations are a function of two variables: admissions and lengths of stay. We can dramatically reduce detention populations simply by moving cases through the system more efficiently.
- ✓ Expedited case processing is important for many reasons. For one thing, research & experience tell us that we need to respond to youthful misbehavior quickly if we expect it to change. Do any of you, when your kids do bad things, tell them, “We’ll deal with this in 90 days”? Of course not, yet that’s what we do in juvenile justice all the time.
- ✓ Expedited case processing also ensures that program resources are used efficiently. If we keep kids in ATD programs too long, we won’t be able to serve other youth, who will then languish in detention awaiting a program slot. And if we leave youth at large too long, their odds of missing a court date, or picking up a new charge—even a very minor one—will increase, thereby increasing the odds of detention.
- ✓ Expediting case processing does not require money or changes in juvenile behavior. It requires that the adults in the system eliminate unnecessary delays.

- ✓ **SPECIAL DETENTION CASES** refers to 3 groups of cases that require special attention. These include youth held on writs or warrants, youth held for probation violations and youth who are awaiting placement.

- ✓ Experience has taught us that these cases often require unique strategies to minimize their presence in detention. Consider probation violations: in most places, whether you are detained for a rule violation is as much a function of who your probation officer is than it is a function of the seriousness of your violation or the risk you pose. To remedy this, sites need to have more structured ways of responding to violations, appropriate supervisory oversight, and a range of alternative sanctions.

- ✓ **STRATEGIES TO REDUCE RACIAL DISPARITIES** must be intentional and practical.
- ✓ In JDAI, sites attempt to reduce DMC by viewing all these core strategies through a racial equity lens. What does that mean? For example, it means that when we form collaboratives, we ask whether or not people of color are represented. It means when we collect data about detention, we ensure that the data are routinely disaggregated by race and ethnicity so we can see where disparities are found. When we talk about establishing detention alternatives, we look to see if those programs are culturally competent, located near where the kids in detention reside, etc.
- ✓ We have developed a system assessment framework that expands upon this discussion, that identifies ways that sites can keep focused on eliminating DMC by carefully attending to the details of their systems.

- ✓ **RIGOROUS FACILITY INSPECTIONS** are the last of the 8 core strategies.
- ✓ We noted earlier that improved conditions of confinement are a fundamental objective of JDAI. In fact, we would consider these reforms hollow, indeed, if our new systems reduced detention use but held those who had to be held in deplorable conditions. How can we improve conditions of confinement?
- ✓ The most basic way is to increase awareness of those conditions. In JDAI, all sites form self-assessment teams that are trained in a rather rigorous set of facility standards and related inspection methodology. These teams are composed of system personnel and other interested citizens, especially those whose interests or expertise are relevant to various aspects of detention operations (e.g., a psychologist to determine whether mental health services are appropriate). Annually, the teams inspect the facility and provide feedback both to its administrators and to the JDAI collaborative.
- ✓ What we have found is simple: increase transparency—that is, greater awareness of what’s happening behind those walls—helps to minimize bad conditions, first by identifying them but, as importantly, also by providing support for changes.
- ✓ The standards used in the JDAI self-inspection process are probably the most demanding in the field. They were established by national experts and tested in our sites. We set the bar high not because we want sites to “fail” the inspections (this is not a pass/fail situation), but because we want our sites to aspire to be the best in the field.
- ✓ We will work cooperatively with those state officials currently responsible for inspection of local detention facilities to figure out how to incorporate or coordinate the JDAI self-assessment process with their ongoing oversight of the facilities.

- ✓ **ONE LAST THING ABOUT THE CORE STRATEGIES** before we move on.
- ✓ It is critical to note that these strategies are fundamentally interconnected. What we have been describing is not a menu of options from which you can choose. The individual strategies are unlikely to succeed in isolation.
- ✓ For example, if a site does not have a good risk assessment instrument, it will not be able to identify which youth should be placed in ATD programs. Similarly, if youth in ATD programs are not moved through the system efficiently (because of expedited case processing), they are more likely to fail at high rates, which will undermine confidence in—and therefore use of—the program. Conditions of confinement are unlikely to improve if there is chronic crowding. The list of these inter-connections could go on and on.
- ✓ What is critical for attendees to know is that detention reform must address all of these 8 core areas if it is to succeed. That is a formidable challenge, especially since you all have full-time jobs already. But, if you really want to improve your detention system—and if you want detention reform to stimulate and support even broader system changes—our experience clearly teaches that you have got to take on the whole array of changes.

Slide #11: Cook County Outcomes

- ✓ So, did all this stuff make a difference? Here are some results from some of our more “mature” JDAI sites, places that some of you will get to visit as part of the work on this project.
- ✓ Cook County, Illinois is where Chicago is. It dramatically reduced its reliance on detention. In 1996, the 498-bed facility average almost 700 youth per day and held as many as 840 at one time. As we meet here today, their population is well below 400 and they have been under capacity now for eight straight years.
- ✓ Please note also that Cook County’s youth crime has decreased even though they are detaining far fewer youth. Though there are a number of ways to interpret or debate this data, what these numbers do, at a minimum, is lay waste to the myth that if we lock up fewer youth, we will unleash a juvenile crime wave.

Slide #12: Multnomah County Outcomes

- ✓ This is Portland, Oregon. This site reduced its average daily population by two-thirds! And if you watch the JDAI video, *These Are Our Kids*, you will see this site's main juvenile prosecutor proclaim that they are locking up far fewer kids and have the lowest recidivism results ever.

Slide #13: DCJ Detain Rate by Anglo/Minority

- ✓ One of Multnomah County's most significant accomplishments was to be the first site in the country to measurably reduce racial disparities in their system.
- ✓ This graph shows the odds that arrested white youth and arrested minority youth will be detained in this site over time. As you can see, in 1994, kids of color were about 1/3 more likely to be detained following an arrest than their white counterparts. By 2000, all kids were less likely to be detained, and the disparity in the odds had been eliminated.
- ✓ How did this happen? Multnomah, through determined leadership and data-driven decision making, eliminated unintended bias and leveled the playing field for all youth. You can learn more about their efforts by reading *Pathway #8*.

Slide #14: Santa Cruz Outcomes

- ✓ Santa Cruz was our first replication site. It is important to our story for one particular reason and that is that we never gave this county a dime for detention reform. It never received a grant from the Casey Foundation, nor from any other source, specifically for detention reform.
- ✓ What happened in this site? One of the early JDAI leaders from another site was hired as Santa Cruz' chief probation officer. He brought with him the core strategies we have described and convinced his colleagues to implement them.
- ✓ Santa Cruz, therefore, demonstrated that detention reform is really not about money; it's about determination, about leadership, about the technical know-how needed to change the way we currently do the detention business.

Slide #15: Multnomah County Resource Deployment

- ✓ We mentioned earlier that detention reform was good because it helped government avoid unnecessary expenditures. In Multnomah County, three units of the detention center were mothballed because of the reductions in detention use. Each of these units cost the county about \$800,000 annually to operate. This means that almost \$2.5 million was saved annually, and much of those funds were redeployed to support community programs, reduced caseload sizes and other constructive changes.

Slide #16: Project Cost Analysis, Cook County

- ✓ In Chicago, in the early 1990s, persistent crowding had led the county board to approve financing for a new 200 bed detention center. A conservative estimate of the cost of building, financing and operating a single bed over a twenty year period is \$1.5 million. In effect, the Board was committing the county to \$300 million in new detention-related costs over the next two decades
- ✓ Because of the reforms that were implemented, that new facility never had to be built. The county has been supporting ATD programs in this site to the tune of about \$3 million annually. This may seem like a lot of money. But the Board has recognized that over 20 years, those programs will cost it \$60 million, compared to the \$300 million that a new facility would have cost.
- ✓ It is because of these dramatic costs savings that funding for ATD programming in Cook County is routinely approved each year, even during difficult budget years.

Slide #17: Cook County Average Monthly Residential Placements

- ✓ At the beginning of this presentation we said that it was our hope that detention reform would stimulate and support even broader changes in the ways that system operate. The evidence is now pretty clear that that hypothesis was correct.
- ✓ This graph shows the change in Cook County's use of out-of-home placements for youth adjudicated delinquent. As you can see, as detention reform progressed, Cook County dramatically reduced out-of-home placements, from a daily average of 426 in 1996 to 76 in 2005. Corresponding government expenses for these placements decreased from \$19 million to \$7.5 million.
- ✓ As was predicted, reduced reliance on detention resulted in fewer youth ending up in the system's deep end.

Slide #18: Cook County IDOC Commitments

- ✓ Similarly, as Cook County's detention reform efforts progressed, it also committed far fewer youth to the state's youth corrections system. In 1997, 902 youth were committed to IDOC; by 2004, that number was cut in half.
- ✓ Reductions in out-of-home placements and corrections commitments are only two of the many ways that JDAI has produced system changes in our sites. Jurisdictions have improved decision making at numerous points in their systems. They have learned how to use data better. They have strengthened their connections to families and youth in various ways, increased reliance on community-based programs and developed new strategies to make their systems fair and equitable for all youth. You can read about these impressive changes in the most recent addition to the *Pathways* series, volume 14 entitled *Beyond Detention*.

Slide #19: Map

- ✓ As you can see, JDAI is not some fringe initiative, restricted to a few kooky places that want to coddle juvenile delinquents.
- ✓ JDAI is now the most widely replicated and extensively documented juvenile justice reform initiative in decades. We say this not to boast, but rather to assure you that you are embarking on a well-tested process that your peers in jurisdictions of all sizes and political stripes have already undertaken.
- ✓ Indeed, one of the great benefits that you will have as you pursue detention reform is that you will have the advantage of traveling down a path well-worn by the experience of others. You will be able to learn from their innovations and their mistakes, many of which are readily available to you on-line or in hard copy.

Slide #20: What JDAI Participation Provides

- ✓ Because JDAI has gotten so big, the Casey Foundation can't provide large grants to participating sites. Besides, we learned over 15 years that doing JDAI is really not about money. Most public systems have plenty of funds that could be redeployed to these purposes.
- ✓ Still, we have made a small cash grant to the state to support travel and/or coordination of the initiative.
- ✓ Most importantly, JDAI participation provides sites with technical assistance of various sorts. Your site will have an experienced member of our TA team assigned to work with folks at the local and state levels to implement reforms and broker initiative resources.
- ✓ JDAI has published materials, including "how-to" tools, that provide many of the technical details necessary to design and implement reforms. We also have the JDAI Help Desk, an on-line resource that includes a library of relevant documents from JDAI sites nationally.
- ✓ Participation in JDAI enables you to send groups to JDAI model sites to learn what others have done and explore issues with your peers.
- ✓ We also offer training seminars that will be essential to your work. In year one, for example, formal training seminars will be available on (a) the fundamentals of JDAI, (b) designing and testing risk assessment instruments and (c) conducting facility self-assessments.
- ✓ Being a JDAI site reserves your jurisdiction's table at the annual JDAI inter-site conference. These conferences provide excellent opportunities both to learn about innovations in other sites and to network with colleagues from around the country.
- ✓ Finally, JDAI participation plugs you into a network of places and peers engaged in similar efforts to strengthen juvenile justice.

Slide #21: What JDAI Participation Requires

- ✓ The guts of JDAI are the 8 core strategies. Participating in this initiative is based upon a commitment to pursue all 8 strategies. This is a large and challenging undertaking, but your response to the magnitude or difficulty of the assignment can not be to pick and choose from the list of strategies. As we said earlier, the strategies fit together like the parts of a puzzle.
- ✓ Juvenile justice history is littered with interesting, innovative reform models and programs that lost their power when folks tried to replicate them. The secret to successful replication is “fidelity to model”, sticking with the methods and approaches that have been proven to work. There is plenty of room in JDAI for innovation and site-related adaptation. However, without a firm commitment to the genuinely learning the model, and a willingness to correct your course when you stray from it, you will end up with a hybrid that doesn’t produce the results or stimulate the changes we have been describing and you will dilute a model that numerous other places are trying to follow with fidelity.
- ✓ Hard experiences have made it clear that absent determined, sustained leadership, the kinds of changes we are proposing will not be implemented, much less succeed. Some folks must step forward to be the champions of detention reform in each site. In particular, judicial leadership is essential, though certainly not the only leadership needed.
- ✓ JDAI is not a test. It is a process intended to strengthen juvenile justice in many ways. If the Casey Foundation and its technical assistance team are to be helpful in your detention reform work, you must be prepared to share your problems and troubles with us, not just your successes. Candor and collaboration should characterize our relationships.